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We show the information-theoretic security proof of the differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum
key distribution (QKD) protocol based on the complementarity approach [arXiv:0704.3661 (2007)].
Our security proof provides a slightly better key generation rate compared to the one derived
in the previous security proof in [arXiv:1208.1995 (2012)] that is based on the Shor-Preskill ap-
proach [Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000)]. This improvement is obtained because the comple-
mentarity approach can employ more detailed information on Alice’s sending state in estimating
the leaked information to an eavesdropper. Moreover, we remove the necessity of the numerical
calculation that was needed in the previous analysis to estimate the leaked information. This leads
to an advantage that our security proof enables us to evaluate the security of the DPS protocol with
any block size. This paper highlights one of the fundamental differences between the Shor-Preskill
and the complementarity approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) holds promise to
achieve information-theoretically secure communication
between two distant parties (Alice and Bob) against any
eavesdropper (Eve). Since the first invention of the BB84
protocol [1], many QKD protocols have been proposed
so far [2–9]. Among them, the differential-phase-shift
(DPS) QKD protocol [8] has been considered as one of
the promising protocols for future implementation since
this protocol can be rather simply implemented with a
passive detection unit. Recently, a field demonstration of
the DPS protocol [10] has already been conducted, and
the information-theoretic security proofs of the DPS pro-
tocol have been established when Alice employs a single-
photon source [11] and a block-wise phase-randomized
coherent light source [12].
The previous security proof [12] with coherent light
source is based on the Shor-Preskill approach [13] in
which Alice and Bob virtually extract a maximally-
entangled state (MES) to show that they share a
monogamy correlation. In order to extract an MES, Al-
ice and Bob use some estimated information about the
correlation between them. Specifically, this information
consists of the bit and phase error rates, where the phase
error is defined by fictitious erroneous outcomes when
Alice and Bob would have measured their virtual qubits
in a basis conjugate to the basis for generating the key.
Since the phase error rate cannot be directly obtained in
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the experiment, the estimation of this quantity is a cen-
tral issue in the security proof, and some security proofs
have been conducted along this approach [11, 14–18].
Another approach for the security proof is the comple-
mentarity approach [19]. In this approach, a complemen-
tary control of the actual protocol and a virtual protocol
are considered, which Alice and Bob choose to execute,
but cannot execute simultaneously. The goal of the ac-
tual protocol is to agree on the bit values along the key
generation basis, say theX basis, while in the virtual pro-
tocol, Alice and Bob collaborate to create an eigenstate
of the Z basis (a complementary basis to the X basis) in
Alice’s side. With these protocols, Koashi proved in [19]
that the necessary and sufficient condition for the secure
key distillation is to be able to execute whichever task was
chosen. On one hand, once an MES is shared between
Alice and Bob, they also accomplish the complementary
task, which implies that the Shor-Preskill approach is in-
cluded in the complementarity one. On the other hand,
the purpose of the complementarity approach is to create
an eigenstate of the Z basis at Alice’s side, and therefore,
we can employ some additional information, such as the
one on Alice’s sending state, which may provide an ad-
vantage over the Shor-Preskill approach.
In this paper, we show that these two approaches in-
deed give a different resulting secret key rate of the DPS
QKD protocol by exploiting a property of pulses emitted
by Alice. More specifically, we adopt the complementar-
ity approach for the security proof where we accommo-
date the intuition that it is difficult to extract informa-
tion from a train of weak coherent pulses employed in the
DPS protocol. As a result, we show that the secure key
rate based on the complementarity approach is 1.22 times
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2as high as the one based on the Shor-Preskill approach
when the bit error rate is 2%. Moreover, we remove the
necessity of the numerical calculation that was needed to
evaluate the leaked information to Eve in the previous
analysis [12], and we provide the closed formulas for the
upper bounds on the leaked information. This leads to an
advantage that our security proof enables us to evaluate
the security of the DPS protocol with any block size.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we in-
troduce the DPS protocol including the assumptions on
Alice and Bob’s devices. In Sec. III, we explain our
security proof based on the complementarity approach.
In our security proof, we estimate the leaked informa-
tion for each photon number emission separately, and in
Sec. IV, we show the resulting upper bounds on the esti-
mated leaked information up to the two-photon emission
events. In Sec. V, we compare the resulting secret key
rates based on the Shor-Preskill and the complementarity
approaches, and finally, we conclude our paper in Sec. VI.
II. DPS QKD
We first describe the setup of the DPS protocol (see
Fig. 1), and list up the assumptions we make on Alice and
Bob’s devices. Note that the setup and the assumptions
are exactly the same as those in [12].
A. Setup and assumptions
Alice uses a laser source emitting coherent pulses and
a phase modulator, and a train of L (L ≥ 3) pulses forms
a block. Bob uses a one-bit delay interferometer with
two 50:50 beam splitters and with its delay being equal
to the interval of the neighboring sending pulses. After
the interferometer, the pulses are detected by two pho-
ton detectors corresponding to bit values of 0 and 1. The
jth (1 ≤ j ≤ L − 1) time slot is defined as an expected
detection time at Bob’s detectors from the superposition
of the jth and (j + 1)th incoming pulses. Also, the 0th
(Lth) time slot is defined as an expected detection time
at Bob’s detectors from the superposition of the 1st (Lth)
incoming pulse and the Lth incoming pulse in the previ-
ous block (1st incoming pulse in the next block).
As for the assumptions on Alice’s device, we assume
that (A 1) the phase modulator randomly modulates each
relative phase between adjacent sending pulses by 0 or
pi. Moreover, (A 2) the randomization of overall optical
phase δ is done for each block of L pulses. This means
that the quantum state of the L pulses is written as a
classical mixture of the total photon number contained
in the L pulses. Besides, (A 3) we do not consider any
side-channel in Alice’s site.
Regarding the assumptions on Bob’s device, we sup-
pose that (B 1) Bob uses two photon-number-resolving
(PNR) detectors, which can discriminate among the vac-
uum, a single-photon and multiphoton. Also, we assume
that (B 2) the detection efficiency is the same for both
detectors. Finally, (B 3) we do not consider any side-
channel in Bob’s site.
B. Actual protocol
The actual protocol proceeds as follows. In its descrip-
tion, |κ| denotes the length of a bit string κ.
(a 1) Alice generates a random L-bit sequence s1s2...sL
and a random common phase shift δ ∈ [0, 2pi). For a
random L-bit sequence s1s2...sL, she sends the following
coherent state (system HS) to Bob through a quantum
channel
L⊗
i=1
|eiδ(−1)siα〉S,i, (1)
where |α〉S,i represents the coherent state∑
n e
−|α|2/2αn|n〉S,i/
√
n! of the ith pulse mode.
(a 2) Bob performs the interference measurement with
two PNR detectors, and we call the successful detection
event if Bob detects one-photon in the jth time slot (with
1 ≤ j ≤ L− 1), and detects the vacuum in all the other
time slots including the 0th and Lth time slots. If the
successful detection occurs, the variable j is set to the
time slot, otherwise Bob sets j = 0. If j 6= 0, he obtains
his raw bit s ∈ {0, 1} depending on which detector has
reported a detection at the jth time slot. Bob announces
j over an authenticated public channel.
(a 3) If j 6= 0, Alice calculates her raw key bit as
sj ⊕ sj+1 ∈ {0, 1}.
(a 4) Alice and Bob repeat steps (a 1)-(a 3) N times.
(a 5) Alice defines a sifted key κA by concatenating
the successful detection events (i.e., j 6= 0).
(a 6) Bob defines a sifted key κB by concatenating the
successful detection events (i.e., j 6= 0).
(a 7) Bob corrects the errors in his sifted key κB to
make it coincide with κA by sacrificing |κA|fEC bits of
encrypted public communication from Alice by consum-
ing the same length of the pre-shared secret key.
(a 8) Alice and Bob conduct privacy amplification by
shortening their keys by |κA|fPA to obtain the final keys.
In this paper, we consider the asymptotic limit of the
sifted key length (N → ∞). In the experiments, the
following parameters are observed:
Q :=
|κA|
N
, e(b) :=
wt(κA − κB)
|κA| , (2)
where the minus sign is a bit-by-bit modulo-2 subtraction
and wt(κ) denotes the weight (the number of 1’s) in a
bit string κ. In the asymptotic limit, fEC is given by a
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FIG. 1: Setup of the actual protocol. At Alice’s site, pulse trains are generated by a laser source followed by the phase
modulator (PM) that randomly modulates a phase δ or δ + pi with δ being randomly chosen from [0, 2pi) for each block of L
pulses. At Bob’s site, each pulse train is fed to a one-bit delay Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two 50:50 beam splitters.
The pulse trains leaving the interferometer are measured by two photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors corresponding to
bit values “0” and “1”. A successful detection event occurs if Bob detects a single-photon in the only one time slot j (with
1 ≤ j ≤ L− 1), and detects the vacuum in all the other time slots including the 0th and Lth time slots.
function of the bit error rate e(b). The asymptotic key
generation rate per sending pulse is given by [20, 21]
G = [Q(1− fEC(e(b))− fPA)]/L. (3)
In this key generation formula, we omit for simplicity the
random sampling procedure to estimate the bit error rate
e(b) because its cost is negligible in the asymptotic limit.
In step (a 2), when the successful detection event
(j 6= 0) occurs, the state of the incoming L pulses is
expressed by the Hilbert space HB spanned by L states,
and we denote its orthonormal basis by {|i〉B}Li=1, with i
representing the position of the single-photon before the
first beam splitter. Determination of the detected time
slot j and the bit value s ∈ {0, 1} is represented by a gen-
eralized measurement on the system HB . Let Πˆj,s be the
POVM elements for the bit value s detected at the jth
time slot (with 1 ≤ j ≤ L − 1). Considering the action
of the beam splitters, they are written as
Πˆj,s = Pˆ
(√κj |j〉B + (−1)s√κj+1|j + 1〉B√
2
)
(4)
with κ1 = κL = 1 and κi = 1/2 (for 2 ≤ i ≤ L − 1).
Here we define Pˆ (|·〉) = |·〉〈·|. For later discussions, we
decompose Πˆj,s into two consecutive measurements. The
first one is a filter operation Fˆj : HB → HBq with 1 ≤
j ≤ L− 1, which gives the outcome j and leaves a qubit
system HBq . The second one measures the qubit in the
Z basis {|0〉Bq , |1〉Bq}. By using the filter operation and
the qubit measurement, Πˆj,s can be decomposed as
Πˆj,s = Fˆ
†
j Pˆ (|s〉Bq)Fˆj (5)
if we choose Fˆj as
Fˆj =
√
κj |−〉BqB〈j|+
√
κj+1|+〉BqB〈j + 1|. (6)
Here, we define the X basis state as |±〉 = (|0〉±|1〉)/√2.
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FIG. 2: (a) Alice’s operation in the alternative protocol. She
inputs the jth and (j + 1)th qubits to the C-NOT gate with
the jth one being the control and the (j + 1)th one being the
target. After that, the (j + 1)th qubit is measured in the
Z basis, and the jth qubit is measured in the X basis. (b)
Alice’s procedure to estimate the outcome zj ∈ {0, 1} of the
complementary observable, that is, the Z basis measurement
on the jth qubit. After she performs the C-NOT gate, she
measures her (j + 1)th qubit in the Z basis. If zj+1 = 0 (1),
she uses this information (this information and xB ∈ {+,−}
in step (al 3∗)), and she predicts the outcome zj .
III. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we prove the security of the protocol
described in Sec. II B, and determine the amount of pri-
vacy amplification fPA in the asymptotic limit.
A. Alternative protocol
To explain our security proof, we introduce an alter-
native protocol equivalent to the actual one, which is
designated to fulfill the following conditions.
(i) The state of the optical pulses emitted by Alice and
the data processing for generating the final key are iden-
tical to the ones of the actual protocol.
(ii) Bob’s measurement on receiving the L pulses and
his announcement of j over an authenticated public chan-
nel are identical to the actual protocol.
These two conditions ensure that Eve cannot change her
4attack depending on which of the actual and the alter-
native protocols is conducted, resulting in the identical
correlation between the final key and Eve’s quantum sys-
tem. Hence, the final key in the actual protocol is secure
in terms of the composable security [22] if the alternative
protocol is secure against Eve’s general attack.
As an alternative protocol, we consider an
entanglement-based protocol in which Alice prepares L
auxiliary qubits of system HA located in Alice’s site and
L coherent pulses of system HS in state
|Φ〉C,A,S =
∞∑
ν=0
|ν〉C pˆiν
L⊗
i=1
|φ〉A,S,i (7)
with
|φ〉A,S,i = 1√
2
1∑
si=0
Hˆ|si〉A,i|(−1)siα〉S,i. (8)
Here, pˆiν denotes the projection of the L pulses onto the
subspace where ν photons are contained in the L pulses,
HC is a system storing the information of the outcome
of the projection, and also we define the Hadamard op-
eration as Hˆ = 1/
√
2
∑
x,y=0,1(−1)xy|x〉〈y|. To generate
a raw key bit, Alice measures her auxiliary qubit in the
X basis.
Now, we introduce an alternative entanglement-based
protocol that satisfies the above conditions (i) and (ii).
A controlled-NOT (C-NOT) gate Uˆ
(j)
CNOT appearing in
the protocol is defined on the Z basis {|0〉, |1〉} by
Uˆ
(j)
CNOT|x〉A,j |y〉A,j+1 = |x〉A,j |x ⊕ y〉A,j+1 (with x, y ∈
{0, 1}).
The protocol proceeds as follows.
(al 1) Alice prepares the state |Φ〉C,A,S , measures the
system HC to learn the total photon number ν in the L
pulses, and sends the L pulses to Bob through a quantum
channel.
(al 2) Bob receives the L pulses and carries out the
quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement to test if
there is exactly one photon in total from the j = 1th to
j = (L − 1)th time slots and the vacuum in the j = 0th
and Lth time slots. If this test is passed, Bob performs
the filter operation {Fˆj}L−1j=1 in Eq. (6) to know in which
time slot he detects a single-photon, and the variable j
is set to the time slot. Otherwise Bob sets j = 0. Bob
announces j over an authenticated public channel. If
j = 0, Alice and Bob skip steps (al 3) and (al 4) below.
(al 3) Bob measures his qubit Bq in the Z basis
{|0〉Bq , |1〉Bq} and obtains his raw key bit s.
(al 4-1) Alice applies the C-NOT gate on the jth qubit
(control) and (j + 1)th qubit (target) [see Fig. 2 (a)].
(al 4-2) Alice measures the (j+1)th qubit in the Z basis
{|0〉A,j+1, |1〉A,j+1} to obtain the outcome zj+1 ∈ {0, 1}.
(al 4-3) Alice measures the jth qubit in the X basis
{|+〉A,j , |−〉A,j} and determines a raw key bit.
(al 5) Alice and Bob repeat steps (al 1)-(al 4) N times.
(al 6)[=(a 5)] Alice defines a sifted key κA by concate-
nating the successful detection events (i.e., j 6= 0).
(al 7)[=(a 6)] Bob defines a sifted key κB by concate-
nating the successful detection events (i.e., j 6= 0).
(al 8)[=(a 7)] Bob corrects the errors in his sifted key
κB to make it coincide with κA by sacrificing |κA|fEC
bits of encrypted public communication from Alice by
consuming the same length of the pre-shared secret key.
This alternative protocol satisfies the above conditions
(i) and (ii) because of the following reasons. First, as for
(i), we show that Alice’s procedure dictated in (i) is the
same between both actual and alternative protocols by
modifying Alice’s procedure in the alternative protocol.
For this, since the outcome zj+1 obtained in step (al 4-2)
is neither announced nor used in determining the final
key, we can omit this step. Next, steps (al 4-1) and (al
4-3) are equivalently done by measuring all the L qubits
in the X basis to obtain an L-bit sequence s1s2...sL as
the outcome, and then setting sj ⊕ sj+1. Since the X-
basis measurement on all the qubits does not require the
knowledge of j announced in step (al 2), we can consider
that it is done in step (al 1). Then, using the relation
A,j 〈±|φ〉A,S,j =
1√
2
| ± α〉S,j , (9)
we see that the random L-bit sequence s1s2...sL is ob-
tained, and we thus conclude that Alice’s sending state is
equivalent to Eq. (1). Note that the total photon number
measurement to obtain ν in step (al 1) makes the pulse
train diagonalized in the Fock basis, and with this mea-
surement, the assumption (A 2) introduced in Sec. II A
is satisfied. Hence, the state of the optical pulses emitted
by Alice and the data processing for generating the final
key are identical to the ones of the actual protocol.
Next, we see that the alternative protocol satisfies the
condition (ii). In step (al 2), the QND measurement
over the j = 0th to j = Lth time slots informs Bob if
the successful detection occurs or not (namely, j = 0 or
j 6= 0). The probability of resulting j 6= 0 is the same
as the one in the actual protocol. Moreover, if j 6= 0,
the probability of announcing j (with 1 ≤ j ≤ L − 1)
is the same between both protocols since the following
equation is satisfied from Eq. (5),
1∑
s=0
Πˆj,s = Fˆ
†
j Fˆj . (10)
Hence, the information of j announced by Bob in the
alternative protocol is equivalent to the actual protocol.
Therefore, the alternative protocol satisfies the condi-
tions (i) and (ii), which means that the security of the
alternative protocol guarantees the security of the actual
protocol.
5B. Complementary task
The next step is to determine the amount of privacy
amplification fPA, where we employ the argument of
complementarity [19]. In this approach, we consider a
virtual measurement that is complementary to the one
to determine the sifted key κA. Recall that the measure-
ment to obtain the sifted key is performed in step (al
4-3), and the complementary measurement means that
the measurement basis (X basis) in step (al 4-3) is re-
placed with the complementary basis (here we consider
the Z basis). In other words, the virtual measurement is
described as the following step (al 4-3∗).
(al 4-3∗) Alice measures the jth qubit in the Z basis
{|0〉A,j , |1〉A,j} and determines the outcome zj ∈ {0, 1}.
While Bob, instead of aiming at learning κA, tries to
guess the value of the complementary observable zj . This
suggests that step (al 3) is replaced with the following
step (al 3∗).
(al 3∗) Bob measures his qubit Bq in the X basis
{|+〉Bq , |−〉Bq} and obtains its outcome xB ∈ {+,−}.
In the complementarity argument [19], we need to
quantify how well Alice successfully predicts the out-
come zj of the measurement defined in step (al 4-3
∗)
with a help of Bob through quantum communication (see
Fig. 2 (b) for Alice’s procedure to estimate zj). For the
quantification, we employ the phase error rate. Here,
the phase error rate e(ph) is defined as the probability
that Alice fails her prediction on zj , where the phase er-
ror rate is related to the amount of privacy amplification
QfPA [21].
To accomplish the prediction on zj , Alice employs
three information that could help her prediction, which
are listed below.
• (I-1) xB obtained in step (al 3∗).
• (I-2) zj+1 ∈ {0, 1} obtained in step (al 4-2).
• (I-3) The intensity of Alice’s sending state is weak.
The information (I-1) informs Alice of which of the jth or
(j + 1)th original pulse contains a single-photon, which
corresponds to xB = − or xB = +, respectively. The
failure probability for this prediction, which we call the
phase error rate, is related to the amount of privacy am-
plification (see Eq. (20) for the explicit formula).
As an introduction, we first consider the simplest case
where Eve is absent in the quantum channel (we call this
case the normal operation). In this case, if Bob success-
fully detects a single-photon at the jth time slot, and
depending on his X basis measurement outcome xB = +
or xB = − from the information (I-1), the state of the
jth and (j + 1)th Alice’s systems is written as
|ψ+〉A,j,j+1 := |0〉A,j |1〉A,j+1 (11)
and
|ψ−〉A,j,j+1 := |1〉A,j |0〉A,j+1, (12)
respectively. After Alice performs the C-NOT gate in
step (al 4-1), |ψ+〉A,j,j+1 and |ψ−〉A,j,j+1 are transformed
to
Uˆ
(j)
CNOT|ψ+〉A,j,j+1 = |0〉A,j |1〉A,j+1 (13)
and
Uˆ
(j)
CNOT|ψ−〉A,j,j+1 = |1〉A,j |1〉A,j+1, (14)
respectively. In this case, zj+1 obtained in step (al 4-2)
is always 1, and Alice can predict zj as 0 or 1 without
causing any error depending on Bob’s outcome xB = +
or −, respectively.
Moreover, by following the same arguments above,
if the quantum channel is a linear lossy channel Nη :
Nη|α〉 = |ηα〉, zj+1 = 0 never occurs, and for zj+1 = 1,
Alice can also perfectly predict the outcome zj . Sum-
marizing two examples of the normal operation and the
linear lossy channel case, if zj+1 = 1 as (I-2), the follow-
ing Alice’s prediction succeeds with unit probability,
if zj+1 = 1→ zj =
{
0 if xB = +
1 if xB = −.
(15)
Therefore, in general case (without assuming any channel
model), if zj+1 = 1, we suppose that Alice takes the
above strategy on her prediction.
As we discussed above, the successful detection events
never occur with zj+1 = 0 in the normal operation and
the linear lossy channel case. Hence, if the successful
detection occurs with zj+1 = 0, we consider that Al-
ice always predicts zj as 0 because before Alice sends
the system HS to Bob, zj = 0 is more likely to occur.
This tendency is rather remarkable as the intensity of
the sending state becomes weaker. Mathematically, this
is confirmed as
||A,j〈zj |A,j+1〈0|Uˆ (j)CNOT
⊗
k=j,j+1
|φ〉A,S,k||2
∝ 1 + 〈−α|α〉 [〈−α|α〉+ (−1)
zj2]
2(1 + 〈−α|α〉2) =: p(α, zj) (16)
and p(α, 0)/p(α, 1) = (cothα2)2 ≥ 1. Here, || · || denotes
the trace norm.
From this consideration and (I-3), in any channel
model, we suppose that Alice takes the following strategy
as
if zj+1 = 0→ zj = 0. (17)
It is notable that if zj+1 = 0, Alice does not use Bob’s
information xB [namely, (I-1)] to estimate the outcome
zj , and her prediction is wrong when zj = 1.
6This prediction strategy highlights the difference be-
tween the complementarity approach and Shor-Preskill
approach. Recall that in the Shor-Preskill approach [12],
the goal of Alice and Bob in an alternative protocol is to
generate the maximally entangled state (MES) of the two
qubit systems HA,j and HBq . To generate the MES, the
bit and phase error rates are needed, where the phase
errors are defined as the instances where Alice’s Z ba-
sis measurement outcome in step (al 4-3∗) and Bob’s X
basis measurement outcome in step (al 3∗) are different.
Hence, the phase error is defined as the relation between
zj and xB , which means that it cannot be defined as an
instance only by focusing on Alice’s specific measurement
outcome, such as zj = 1. In fact, if we translate the con-
struction of the phase error POVM in [12] to the com-
plementarity argument, Alice’s prediction for zj+1 = 0
in [12] can be interpreted as follows:
if zj+1 = 0→ zj =
{
0 with probability 1/2
1 with probability 1/2.
(18)
This means that if zj+1 = 0, Alice randomly selects
zj , which implies that the knowledge on Alice’s sending
states [namely, (I-3)] is not used.
Therefore, the prediction in Eq. (17) that uses a prop-
erty of Alice’s sending state highlights one of the unique
features in the complementarity approach, and this dif-
ference of the prediction leads to a tighter upper bound
on the phase error rate, which we show in Sec. IV. Specif-
ically, this difference will be reflected by all the differences
in two curves in Figs. 3, 4 and 5.
Our goal is to obtain the amount of QfPA in Eq. (3).
For this, recall that the photon number measurement is
conducted on the L pulses in step (al 1), and therefore,
QfPA in Eq. (3) can be expressed as a classical mixture
of Fock state, that is,
QfPA =
∞∑
ν=0
Q(ν)f
(ν)
PA . (19)
Here, Q(ν) is defined as Q(ν) =
|κ(ν)A |
N with κ
(ν)
A denot-
ing the sifted key originating from the ν-photon emission
events, and f
(ν)
PA is the amount of privacy amplification for
κ
(ν)
A . From [20, 21], in the asymptotic limit, the amount
of privacy amplification for κ
(ν)
A is given by
f
(ν)
PA = h(e
(ph,ν)), (20)
where h(x) := −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) represents
the binary entropy function, and e(ph,ν) is a phase error
rate for the ν-photon emission events.
Having finished the explanation of the prediction on
zj , next we give an overview of the proof conducted in
the following sections (from Sec. III C to Sec. IV C). The
goal of our discussion is to obtain the upper bound on
the amount of privacy amplification f
(ν)
PA = h(e
(ph,ν)) in
Eq. (20) with the bit error rate e(b,ν). To achieve this
goal, in Sec. III C, we first formulate the POVM ele-
ments for the bit and phase error events. In Sec. III D,
to discuss the security for each photon number emission
event separately, we introduce the projection operator
Pˆ (ν) representing that the state of L pulses is contained
in the ν-photon subspace. In Sec. III E, we relate e(ph,ν)
and e(b,ν), and we show that it suffices to calculate the
quantity Ω(ν)(λ) in Eq. (37) to upper-bound the phase
error rate e(ph,ν). Then, in Sec. IV, we explicitly derive
the quantity Ω(ν)(λ) for ν = 0, 1, 2, and obtain the up-
per bound on e(ph,ν) with the bit error rate e(b,ν) and
Ω(ν)(λ).
C. Bit and phase error POVMs
In this subsection, we construct the POVMs for the
phase and bit errors. The POVM elements for the phase
error when the successful detection occurs at the jth
(with 1 ≤ j ≤ L− 1) time slot, which act on the systems
HA,j , HA,j+1 (just before the C-NOT gate in Fig. 2) and
HB , are given by
eˆ
(ph)
j =Pˆ (|1〉A,j |1〉A,j+1)⊗
1∑
s=0
κj+sPˆ (|j + s〉B)
+
1∑
s=0
Pˆ (|s〉A,j |s〉A,j+1)⊗ κj+sPˆ (|j + s〉B), (21)
where we define s¯ = s ⊕ 1. Here, the first and sec-
ond terms correspond to the failure prediction on zj for
zj+1 = 1 [whose prediction strategy is given in Eq. (15)]
and zj+1 = 0 [whose prediction strategy is given in
Eq. (17)], respectively. Next, we construct the POVM
element for the bit error. A bit error is the instance
where Alice’s X basis measurement on her jth auxiliary
qubit in step (al 4-3) and the outcome of Bob’s interfer-
ence measurement defined in Eq. (4) are different. From
this definition, the POVM elements for the bit error for
the jth time slot, which act on the systems HA,j , HA,j+1
and HB , are given by
eˆ
(b)
j =
∑
s,s′
Pˆ (Hˆ|s〉A,j)Pˆ (Hˆ|s′〉A,j+1)Πˆj,s⊕s′⊕1. (22)
For simplicity of analysis, we introduce the unitary op-
erator Uˆ defined by
Uˆ
L⊗
i′=1
(Hˆ|si′〉A,i′)|i〉B = (−1)si
L⊗
i′=1
(Hˆ|si′〉A,i′)|i〉B (23)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ L. By applying Uˆ to eˆ(ph)j in Eq. (21), we
obtain the following equation (see Appendix A for the
7derivation)
Uˆ eˆ
(ph)
j Uˆ
† =
∑
a
Pˆ (|a〉A)⊗[
κjδaj+1,1Pˆ (|j〉B) + κj+1δaj ,1Pˆ (|j + 1〉B)
]
, (24)
where we denote Alice’s Z basis states as |a〉A :=
|a1〉A,1|a2〉A,2...|aL〉A,L with a := a1a2...aL (ai ∈ {0, 1}).
Also, by applying unitary Uˆ to Eq. (22), we have [12]
Uˆ eˆ
(b)
j Uˆ
† = Πˆj,1. (25)
Then, by taking a sum over all the time slots, we obtain
the operators for the phase and bit errors as
eˆ(ph) =
L−1∑
j=1
eˆ
(ph)
j , eˆ
(b) =
L−1∑
j=1
eˆ
(b)
j . (26)
When the state of Alice and Bob’s quantum systems HA
and HB just after the successful QND measurement (j 6=
0) at step (al 2) is ρˆAB , the probability of having a bit
error in the extracted qubit pair of systems HAj and HBq
is given by tr(ρˆAB eˆ
(b)), and the probability of having a
phase error is given by tr(ρˆAB eˆ
(ph)).
By appling Uˆ to eˆ(ph) and eˆ(b), these error operators
are concisely written as follows.
Uˆ eˆ(ph)Uˆ† =
∑
a
Pˆ (|a〉A)⊗ Πˆ(ph)a , (27)
where we define Πˆ
(ph)
a as
Πˆ(ph)a =δa2,1Pˆ (|1〉B) +
L−1∑
i=2
δai−1,1 + δai+1,1
2
Pˆ (|i〉B)
+ δaL−1,1Pˆ (|L〉B), (28)
and
Uˆ eˆ(b)Uˆ† = IˆA ⊗ Πˆ (29)
with
Πˆ =
L−1∑
j=1
Πˆj,1. (30)
Here, Πˆ is a tridiagonal symmetric matrix, and the ma-
trix elements are given by
B〈i|Πˆ|i〉B = 1/2 (for 1 ≤ i ≤ L),
B〈i|Πˆ|i+ 1〉B = −1/(2
√
2) (for i = 1, L− 1),
B〈i|Πˆ|i+ 1〉B = −1/4 (for 2 ≤ i ≤ L− 2). (31)
D. Constraints on Alice’s auxiliary qubit system
HA
Here, we constrain Alice’s auxiliary qubit system HA
by using the knowledge of the total photon number ν con-
tained in the L pulses. For this, we first rewrite Eq. (7)
as
|Φ〉 = 2−L
∑
a
|a〉A
∑
ν
|ν〉C pˆiν
L⊗
i=1
(|α〉i + (−1)ai | − α〉i),
(32)
and from this equation, we see that if the total photon
number is ν, wt(a) ≤ ν is satisfied since |α〉 − | − α〉
contains at least one photon. Also, since |α〉+ (−)| − α〉
contains even (odd) number of photons, we also have
that the parity of ν and wt(a) are the same, that is,
(−1)ν = (−1)wt(a). Therefore, after the successful detec-
tion event (j 6= 0) occurs and the system HC reveals a
photon number ν, the state of Alice and Bob’s systems
are contained in the range projection operator Pˆ (ν) with
Pˆ (ν) :=
∑
a:wt(a)=ν,ν−2,ν−4...
L∑
i=1
Pˆ (|a〉A|i〉B). (33)
Through the unitary Uˆ in Eq. (23), we have [12]
Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ† =
∑
a:wt(a)=ν−1,ν−3...
Pˆ (|a〉A)⊗ IˆB
+
∑
a:wt(a)=ν+1
Pˆ (|a〉A)⊗ Pˆa (34)
with
Pˆa :=
L∑
i=1
Pˆ (|i〉B)δai,1. (35)
Note that Eq. (34) can be derived by using Eq. (A1) in
Appendix A.
E. Relation between the bit and phase errors
In this subsection, we derive the upper bound on the
phase error rate for e(ph,ν) for the ν-photon emission
events by using the bit error rate e(b,ν) originating from
the ν-photon emission events. To obtain this, we consider
deriving the largest eigenvalue Ω(ν)(λ) of the operator
Pˆ (ν)(eˆ(ph) − λeˆ(b))Pˆ (ν) = eˆ(ph,ν) − λeˆ(b,ν) (36)
with 0 < λ < ∞. Here, we define the POVM el-
ements regarding the phase and bit errors for the ν-
photon emission events as eˆ(ph,ν) := Pˆ (ν)eˆ(ph)Pˆ (ν) and
eˆ(b,ν) := Pˆ (ν)eˆ(b)Pˆ (ν), respectively. Once we obtain
8Ω(ν)(λ), we can bound the phase error rate for the ν-
photon emission events as
e(ph,ν) ≤ λe(b,ν) + Ω(ν)(λ), (37)
and hence to derive Ω(ν)(λ) is vital for determining the
key rate. Since the unitary operator does not change the
eigenvalues, Ω(ν)(λ) is also the largest eigenvalue of the
operator [12].
Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ†(Uˆ eˆ(ph)Uˆ† − λUˆ eˆ(b)Uˆ†)Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ†
=
∑
a:wt(a)=ν−1,ν−3...
Pˆ (|a〉A)⊗ (Πˆ(ph)a − λΠˆ)
+
∑
a:wt(a)=ν+1
Pˆ (|a〉A)⊗ Pˆa(Πˆ(ph)a − λΠˆ)Pˆa, (38)
where Eqs. (27), (29) and (34) are used. To obtain an
upper bound on Eq. (38), we use a fact that Eq. (38) is
a direct sum of Πˆ
(ph)
a − λΠˆ with different a of wt(a) =
ν − 1, ν − 3... and Pˆa(Πˆ(ph)a − λΠˆ)Pˆa with a of wt(a) =
ν + 1. Since maxa(Πˆ
(ph)
a − λΠˆ) ≥ maxa′(Πˆ(ph)a′ − λΠˆ)
holds for any a and a′ with wt(a) ≥ wt(a′), we only
need to consider Πˆ
(ph)
a −λΠˆ with wt(a) = ν−1. We thus
conclude that Ω(ν)(λ) is the larger of the two numbers
Ω
(ν)
− (λ) and Ω
(ν)
+ (λ) defined as follows; Ω
(ν)
− (λ) is the
largest eigenvalue of the operator
{Πˆ(ph)a − λΠˆ | wt(a) = ν − 1}, (39)
and Ω
(ν)
+ (λ), which is the largest eigenvalue of the oper-
ator
{Pˆa(Πˆ(ph)a − λΠˆ)Pˆa | wt(a) = ν + 1}. (40)
Recall that Pˆa is defined in Eq. (35), and Pˆa(Πˆ
(ph)
a −
λΠˆ)Pˆa is contained in the subspace {|i〉B} with ai = 1.
IV. EXPLICIT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
BIT AND PHASE ERROR RATES
Here, we derive the explicit relations between e(b,ν) and
e(ph,ν) by evaluating Ω(ν)(λ). For simplicity, we consider
extracting the secret key up to the two-photon emission
events (ν = 0, 1 and 2), and for more than two-photon
emission events, we pessimistically assume that Eve has
perfect knowledge on the sifted keys. Therefore, it is
sufficient to provide the relationship for ν = 0, 1, and 2.
A. Zero-photon part
First, we discuss the case for ν = 0 when Alice emits
zero-photon. Since Ω
(0)
− (λ) has no candidates for ν = 0,
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FIG. 3: Color online: The upper bound on the phase error
rates e(ph,1) as a function of e(b,1). The red curve is based
on the previous Shor-Preskill analysis [12] and the blue one is
our analysis based on the complementarity. Note that these
bounds are independent of the block length L.
Ω(0)(λ) = Ω
(0)
+ (λ). For Ω
(0)
+ (λ), regardless of i such that
ai = 1, we have
Ω(0)(λ) = B〈i|(Πˆ(ph)a − λΠˆ)|i〉B = −λ/2, (41)
which corresponds to the single fixed point
(e(b,0), e(ph,0)) = (1/2, 0).
B. Single-photon part
Next, we derive a relation between e(b,1) and e(ph,1).
First, as for Ω
(1)
− (λ), since Πˆ
(ph)
a = 0 from Eq. (39),
Ω
(1)
− (λ) is a largest eigenvalue of −λΠˆ, which is zero 1.
Next, for the derivation of Ω
(1)
+ (λ), since wt(a) = 2 from
its definition in Eq. (40), there are
(
L
2
)
patterns to choose
i and j such that ai = aj = 1 holds. In order to find the
pair (i, j) to achieve the largest eigenvalue of Eq. (40),
we use the following fact (see [23] for its proof).
Fact 1 Given two n × n real matrices A = (Ai,j)i,j
and A˜ = (A˜i,j)i,j, whose off-diagonal elements are non-
negative, their largest eigenvalues (respectively denoted
by ΛA and ΛA˜) have a relation
ΛA ≥ ΛA˜ (42)
if Ai,j ≥ A˜i,j holds for any i and j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ n).
Thanks to this fact and Eqs. (28) and (30), we find that
the largest eigenvalue Ω
(1)
+ (λ) is achieved on the subspace
{|1〉B , |2〉B} [namely, (i, j) = (1, 2)], and by calculating
the largest eigenvalue of Pˆa(Πˆ
(ph)
a − λΠˆ)Pˆa with a1 =
a2 = 1, we have Ω
(1)
+ (λ) in Lemma 1.
1 Note that B〈ψ|Πˆ|ψ〉B = 0 is achieved only for the state |ψ〉B =
[
∑L−1
i=2 |i〉B + (|1〉B + |L〉B)/
√
2]/
√
L− 1.
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FIG. 4: Color online: The upper bound on the phase error
rates e(ph,2) as a function of e(b,2) with L = 10. The red curve
is based on the previous Shor-Preskill analysis and the blue
one is our analysis based on the complementarity.
Lemma 1 Ω
(1)
+ (λ) is given by
Ω
(1)
+ (λ) = (3− 2λ+
√
1 + 2λ2)/4, (43)
which is non-negative if λ ≤ (3 +√5).
Then, by combining the results of Ω
(1)
± (λ), Ω
(1)(λ) =
max{Ω(1)+ (λ),Ω(1)− (λ)} is given by
Ω(1)(λ) =
{
0 (λ > 3 +
√
5)
(3− 2λ+√1 + 2λ2)/4 (λ ≤ 3 +√5).
(44)
Then, from Eq. (44), an upper bound on the phase error
rate for the single-photon emission events is given in the
Theorem 1 (see Appendix B for its proof).
Theorem 1 The upper bound on e(ph,1) is given by
e(ph,1) ≤ (3 +
√
5)e(b,1) (45)
if 0 ≤ e(b,1) ≤ (10− 3√5)/22 and
e(ph,1) ≤ inf
0<λ<3+
√
5
{λe(b,1) + (3− 2λ+
√
1 + 2λ2)/4}
(46)
if (10− 3√5)/22 < e(b,1).
In Fig. 3, we plot the resulting relation on
(e(b,1), e(ph,1)) (see the blue curve). For comparison, we
compare our result and the previous work [12] (see the
red curve), and we find that our security proof gives a
tighter bound on e(ph,1).
C. Two-photon part
Here, we derive an upper bound on e(ph,2). The eval-
uation of Ω(2)(λ) = max{Ω(2)+ (λ),Ω(2)− (λ)} involves the
calculation of the largest eigenvalues Ω
(2)
+ (λ) and Ω
(2)
− (λ).
As for Ω
(2)
+ (λ), since wt(a) = ν + 1 = 3 from Eq. (40),
we need to choose three indexes 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ L such
that ai = aj = ak = 1 holds. There are
(
L
3
)
patterns
for the choices, and we need to find out the pair (i, j, k)
that achieves the largest eigenvalue of Eq. (40). In so
doing, the previous analysis [12] relies on a numerical
method that compares each of all the largest eigenvalues
of Eq. (40) with different (i, j, k), which becomes compli-
cated as L becomes larger. On the other hand, we do not
rely on a numerical method and derive Ω
(2)
+ (λ) in a closed
form as will be shown in Theorem 2, which holds for any
L of L ≥ 3. This can be accomplished by using the fact 1,
and as a result, we find that the largest eigenvalue Ω
(2)
+ (λ)
is obtained on the subspace {|1〉B , |2〉B , |3〉B} [namely,
(i, j, k) = (1, 2, 3)]. By calculating the largest eigenvalue
of Pˆa(Πˆ
(ph)
a − λΠˆ)Pˆa with a1 = a2 = a3 = 1, the largest
eigenvalue Ω
(2)
+ (λ) of Eq. (40) is given in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 Ω
(2)
+ (λ) is given by x/4, where x is the max-
imum solution of the following equality for x,
− 32 + 64λ− 32λ2 + 2λ3 + (32− 40λ+ 9λ2)x
+ (6λ− 10)x2 + x3 = 0. (47)
Next, we derive Ω
(2)
− (λ) that is the largest eigenvalue
of the operator defined in Eq. (39). In this case, since
wt(a) = ν−1 = 1, we need to find a with wt(a) = 1 that
achieves the largest eigenvalue of the operator Πˆ
(ph)
a −λΠˆ.
For this, we again note that the previous analysis [12]
relies on a numerical method that compares each of all
the largest eigenvalues of Eq. (39) with different a of
wt(a) = 1. On the other hand, we do not rely on such
a numerical method and derive Ω
(2)
− (λ) in a closed form
as shown in Theorem 3 that can be applied for any L of
L ≥ 3 (see Appendix C for the proof).
Theorem 3 Among various a with wt(a) = 1, the
largest eigenvalue of Πˆ
(ph)
a − λΠˆ realizes when a =
0100...0.
Thanks to this Theorem, we have that Ω
(2)
− (λ) is the
largest eigenvalue of the operator Πˆ
(ph)
a:a=0100...0 − λΠˆ.
Whether Ω
(2)
+ (λ) is larger than Ω
(2)
− (λ) or not depends
on λ. With a constant λ˜, which is solely dependent on
L, Ω
(2)
+ (λ) ≤ Ω(2)− (λ) for λ ≥ λ˜ and Ω(2)+ (λ) > Ω(2)− (λ)
for λ < λ˜. As a result, the boundary of (e(b,2), e(ph,2))
consists of two convex curves determined from Ω
(2)
± (λ)
and a straight line with the slope λ˜ connecting them,
which is shown in Fig. 4 (see the blue curve). We also
show the previous result of the relation (e(b,2), e(ph,2))
in [12] (see the red curve), and we find that the resulting
relation is almost the same.
Recall that the secret keys are generated from the
ν =0, 1 and 2-photon emission events, and we take a
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worst case scenario that if Alice emits more than two
photons, Eve has perfect knowledge on the sifted keys.
From this consideration, the amount of privacy amplifi-
cation in Eq. (19) is upper bounded by
QfPA =
∞∑
ν=0
Q(ν)h(e(ph,ν)) ≤
∞∑
ν=0
Q(ν)[γe(b,ν) + Ω
(ν)
h (γ)]
≤ γe(b) +
2∑
ν=0
Q(ν)Ω
(ν)
h (γ) +
∑
ν≥3
Q(ν)
= γe(b) +Q+
2∑
ν=0
Q(ν)(Ω
(ν)
h (γ)− 1), (48)
where in the first inequality, we bound the convex regions
of (e(b,ν), h(e(ph,ν))) specified by a set of linear inequali-
ties with 0 < γ <∞,
h(e(ph,ν)) ≤ γe(b,ν) + Ω(ν)h (γ). (49)
Here, Ω
(ν)
h (γ) is the quantity depending on γ and Ω
(ν)(γ).
Also, in the second inequality of Eq. (48), we use the
definition of the bit error rate e(b) =
∑
ν Q
(ν)e(b,ν). Since
we can choose arbitrary γ to lower-bound the amount of
privacy amplification, the lower bound on the asymptotic
key generation rate in Eq. (3) is written as
G ≥
1
L
{
2∑
ν=0
Q(ν) −QfEC(e(b))− inf
γ
[γe(b) +
2∑
ν=0
Q(ν)Ω
(ν)
h (γ)]
}
.
(50)
Here, Q(ν) is chosen to maximize Eq. (48) as [12]
Q(ν) =

pν (ν ≥ νmin + 1)
Q− (1−∑νminν′=0 pν′) (ν = νmin)
0 (ν ≤ νmin − 1),
(51)
where {pν} is the Poisson distribution with mean Lα2
pν = e
−Lα2(Lα2)ν/ν! (52)
and νmin is the integer satisfying
1−
νmin∑
ν′=0
pν′ < Q ≤ 1−
νmin−1∑
ν′=0
pν′ . (53)
V. KEY GENERATION RATES
Here, we show the key generation rates of the DPS
protocol based on our analysis and the previous anal-
ysis in [12]. For both cases, we suppose that the to-
tal detection probability is assumed to be given by Q =
� �� �� �� �� ���
��×��-���×��-�
��×��-���×��-�
��×��-���×��-�
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FIG. 5: Color online: The key generation rate per sending
pulse of the DPS protocol based on our security analysis (blue
curve) and the previous analysis (red curve). In these plots,
we set L = 10 and e(b) = 2%.
(L − 1)ηα2e−(L+1)ηα2 , where we assume that the trans-
mittance of the channel including the detection proba-
bility is given by η = 0.1× 10−0.2l/10, and for simplicity
we adopt fEC(e
(b)) = h(e(b)). In Fig. 5, we show the key
rates for the case of e(b) = 2% and L = 10 by optimizing
the mean photon number α2. As a result, we find that
the secure key rate of the DPS protocol based on our
analysis is 1.22 times as high as the previous one.
We note that the two key generation rates in Fig. 5 do
not decrease drastically after a certain distance. This is
so because we consider the constant bit error rate, which
is independent of the distance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have proven the information-
theoretic security proof for the DPS QKD protocol based
on the complementarity approach. As a result, we found
that our security proof provides a slightly better key
generation rate compared to the previous security proof
based on the Shor-Preskill approach [12]. This improve-
ment is obtained since the complementarity approach can
incorporate more detailed information on Alice’s sending
state to estimate the leaked information to Eve. In par-
ticular, we have employed the information that the in-
tensity of Alice’s sending states is weak, and thanks to
this additional information we have obtained tighter up-
per bounds on the leaked information to Eve compared
to those in the previous proof [12]. Moreover, we have
removed the necessity of the numerical calculation, which
was needed in [12] to derive the leaked information on the
two-photon emission events. This leads to an advantage
that our security proof enables us to evaluate the security
of the DPS protocol with any block size L of L ≥ 3.
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Appendix A: Proof of Eq. (24)
Here, we prove Eq. (24). First, from the definition of Uˆ in Eq. (23), we have
Uˆ Pˆ (|s〉A,i)Pˆ (|i′〉B)Uˆ† = Pˆ (|s⊕ δi,i′〉A,i)Pˆ (|i′〉B). (A1)
By using Eqs. (21) and (A1), a direct calculation leads to the following equation
Uˆ eˆ
(ph)
j Uˆ
† = eˆ(ph)j
=
∑
a
Pˆ (|a〉A)⊗
[
δaj ,0δaj+1,1κjPˆ (|j〉B) + δaj ,1δaj+1,0κj+1Pˆ (|j + 1〉B) + δaj ,1δaj+1,1
(
κj+1Pˆ (|j + 1〉B) + κjPˆ (|j〉B)
)]
=
∑
a
Pˆ (|a〉A)⊗
[
κjδaj+1,1Pˆ (|j〉B) + κj+1δaj ,1Pˆ (|j + 1〉B)
]
, (A2)
which concludes Eq. (24). Note that in the final equation, we use the property of the Kronecker delta δaj ,0+δaj ,1 = 1.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 1. For this, we consider bounding the convex achievable reagion (e(b,1), e(ph,1))
by a straight line with the slope either λ = 3 +
√
5 =: λ0 or λ = λ
′(< λ0). Here, from Eq. (44), λ > λ0 never appears
in the discussion since it is trivially understood from Eqs. (37) and (44) that λ = λ0 gives a tighter bound on e
(ph,1)
than λ > λ0. In a lower bit error rate regime, the convex achievable region is tightly bounded with λ = λ0. On the
other hand, in a higher bit error rate regime, λ′ gives a tighter bound. Hence, we derive the threshold bit error rate
e∗(b,1) that for e(b,1) ≤ (>)e∗(b,1), the convex achievable region is tightly bounded with the slope λ = λ0 (λ′). This
threshold can be derived by solving the following equation:
λ0e
(b,1) + Ω
(1)
+ (λ0) = λ
′e(b,1) + Ω(1)+ (λ
′). (B1)
By using Lemma 1, Eq. (B1) leads to
e(b,1) =
(3−√5− λ′)
2(3− 2λ′ −√1 + 2λ′2) =: f(λ
′). (B2)
By taking a limit of λ′ → λ0, we can derive the threshold bit error rate as e∗(b,1) = limλ′→λ0 f(λ′) = (10− 3
√
5)/22.
This means that for 0 ≤ e(b,1) ≤ e∗(b,1), λ = λ0 is the optimal slope to bound e(ph,1), and for e(b,1) > e∗(b,1), the
optimal slope λ (with 0 < λ < λ0) changes according to the bit error rate as shown in Eq. (46).
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 3 in the main text. We first prove the Theorem for the case of L = 3 and 4,
and after that we prove it for the case of L ≥ 5.
For the cases of L = 3 and 4, through a direct comparison of the largest eigenvalues of the operator Πˆ
(ph)
a − λΠˆ
among various a with wt(a) = 1, it is easy to confirm that the operator gives the largest eigenvalues when a2 = 1.
Next, from now on, we move on to the general case of L ≥ 5. We first introduce two functions F (L, x,w, y)
and gs(L, x,w,m) and investigate their properties, which we use in the main part of the proof in Appendix C 3.
Throughout the discussion below, we assume L ≥ 5, 0 ≤ x, −1 ≤ y ≤ 1 and 0 < w <∞.
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1. Function F (L, x,w, y)
First, we introduce F (L, x,w, y), which is defined as
F (L, x,w, y) =
1
2
coshLx− 2w cosh(L− 1)x+
(
2w2 − 1
2
)
cosh(L− 2)x+ 2w2 cosh(L− 4)x
+ 2w(2w coshx− cosh 2x) cosh (L− 3)xy. (C1)
From this definition, it is easy to confirm that
F
(
L, x,
cosh 2x
2 coshx
, y
)
= − sinhx sinh(L− 5)x ≤ 0 (C2)
and for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1/2,
F (L, 0, w, y) = 4w(2w − 1) ≤ 0. (C3)
Here, w = cosh 2x2 cosh x is a monotonically increasing and one-to-one function from the domain R≥0 to R≥1/2. Hence, an
inverse function f(w) can be defined from R≥1/2 to R≥0 as
xw =
{
0 if w ≤ 1/2
f(w) if w > 1/2.
(C4)
With this notation and Eqs. (C2) and (C3), we have that
L > 5 and w 6= 1
2
⇒ F (L, xw, w, y) < 0, (C5)
L = 5 or w =
1
2
⇒ F (L, xw, w, y) = 0. (C6)
Also, we have a property
lim
x→+∞F (L, x,w, y) = +∞. (C7)
From Eqs. (C5)-(C7) and the continuity of F (L, x,w, y), we obtain
∀L,w, y,∃x ≥ xw, F (L, x,w, y) = 0. (C8)
From this equation, we can define the following function
xmax(L,w, y) = max{x|F (L, x,w, y) = 0}. (C9)
In the case of L > 5 and w 6= 12 , we can confirm from (C5) that xmax(L,w, y) is strictly larger than xw:
xw < xmax(L,w, y). (C10)
Also, Eq. (C10) holds in the case of w = 12 or L = 5. For w =
1
2 and L ≥ 5, Eq. (C10) is satisfied since
d
dx
F
(
L, x,
1
2
, y
)
|x=0 = 0 and d
2
dx2
F
(
L, x,
1
2
, y
)
|x=0 = −2(L− 2) < 0. (C11)
Also, for L = 5 and w 6= 1/2, Eq. (C10) is satisfied since
d
dx
F (5, x, w, y)|w= cosh 2x2 cosh x = −
1
2
cosh−2 x(1 + cosh 2x cosh 2xy)(3 sinhx+ sinh 3x) < 0 (C12)
holds.
Next, since
∀x ≥ xw, 2w coshx− cosh 2x ≤ 0 (C13)
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holds, we have the following relation if 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
∀x ≥ xw, d
dy
F (L, x,w, y) = 2w(2w coshx− cosh 2x)(L− 3)x sinh (L− 3)xy ≤ 0. (C14)
From this equation and Eq. (C10), we obtain
F (L, xmax(L,w, y), w, y) ≥ F (L, xmax(L,w, y), w, 1), (C15)
which leads to the inequality
xmax(L,w, y) ≤ xmax(L,w, 1) (C16)
if 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. As for −1 ≤ y ≤ 0, from the definitions of the function F (L, x,w, y) and xmax, we find that these are
even functions of y. Therefore, for −1 ≤ y ≤ 1,
xmax(L,w, y) = xmax(L,w, |y|) ≤ xmax(L,w, 1) (C17)
is satisfied.
2. Property of the function gs(L, x,w,m)
Next, we introduce the function gs(L, x,w,m) for s ∈ {−1, 1}, which is given by
gs(L, x,w,m) = cosh
(
L− 1
2
+ sm
)
x− 2w cosh
(
L− 3
2
+ sm
)
x. (C18)
This function has a following property that we use in Appendix C 3.
Property 1 For |m| ≤ L−52 ,
gs
(
L, xmax
(
L,w,
2m
L− 3
)
, w,m
)
> 0 (C19)
and for |m| = L−32 ,
g1(L, xmax(L,w, y), w,m) 6= 0 or g−1(L, xmax(L,w, y), w,m) 6= 0. (C20)
Proof of Property 1
First, we prove Eq. (C19). Since gs(L, x,w,m) is a monotonically-decreasing function for w, we have
x > xw, |m| ≤ L− 5
2
⇒ gs(L, x,w,m) > gs
(
L, x,
cosh 2x
2 coshx
,m
)
= sinh
(
L− 5
2
+ sm
)
x tanhx ≥ 0, (C21)
where we use the fact x > xw ⇒ cosh 2x2 cosh x > w. By combining Eqs. (C21) and (C10), we obtain
gs
(
L, xmax
(
L,w,
2m
L− 3
)
, w,m
)
> 0 (C22)
for |m| ≤ L−52 , which concludes Eq. (C19).
As for the proof of Eq. (C20), we use
g1
(
L, x,w,
L− 3
2
)
− g−1
(
L, x,w,
L− 3
2
)
cosh(L− 3)x
=g−1
(
L, x,w,−L− 3
2
)
− g1
(
L, x,w,−L− 3
2
)
cosh(L− 3)x
= sinhx sinh (L− 3)x > 0, (C23)
for x > 0 and since cosh(L− 3)x > 0, we can conclude Eq. (C20).
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3. Calculation of Πˆ
(ph)
a − λΠˆ
Next, we calculate the matrix elements of Πˆ
(ph)
a −λΠˆ = (Πˆ(ph)a −λΠˆ|j,k)j,k, which is a tridiagonal symmetric matrix.
For convenience of notation, we denote the index of low and column of the matrix by j, k ∈ {−L−12 ,−L−32 , ..., L−32 , L−12 }
(not by {1, 2, ..., L− 1, L}). The diagonal elements are given by
Πˆ(ph)a − λΠˆ|j,j =
{
δa±L−3
2
,1 − λ/2 (j = ±L−12 )
(δaj−1,1 + δaj+1,1)/2− λ/2 (j 6= ±L−12 ),
(C24)
and the off-diagonal elements are given by
Πˆ(ph)a − λΠˆ|j,j−1 =

√
2λ/4 (j = L−12 )
λ/4 (−L−52 ≤ j ≤ L−32 )√
2λ/4 (j = −L−32 ).
(C25)
Since we now consider wt(a) = ν− 1 = 1, we need to choose only one j such that aj = 1. If we define m that satisfies
am = 1, Πˆ
(ph)
a − λΠˆ is characterized by m, and we define Aˆ(m) := Πˆ(ph)a:am=1 − λΠˆ. Below, we classify m into three
cases, and for each of all the cases we calculate the matrix elements of Aˆ(m) = (Aˆ(m)|j,k)j,k.
(I) For |m| = L−12 ,
Aˆ(s
L−1
2 )|j,k =
δj,sL−32
− λ
2
δj,k + λ
1 + (
√
2− 1)δ|j+k|,L−2
4
δ|j−k|,1, (C26)
where s ∈ {−1, 1}.
(II) For |m| = L−32 ,
Aˆ(s
L−3
2 )|j,k =
2δj,sL−12
+ δj,sL−52
− λ
2
δj,k + λ
1 + (
√
2− 1)δ|j+k|,L−2
4
δ|j−k|,1. (C27)
(III) For |m| ≤ L−52 ,
Aˆ(m)|j,k = δj,m−1 + δj,m+1 − λ
2
δj,k + λ
1 + (
√
2− 1)δ|j+k|,L−2
4
δ|j−k|,1. (C28)
Now, we prove Theorem 3 that the largest eigenvalue of Aˆ(m) realizes when |m| = L−32 for L ≥ 5 and 0 < λ < ∞.
First, from the above expressions in Eqs. (C26) and (C28), Aˆ(±
L−1
2 ) ≤ Aˆ(±L−52 ) are obtained, and hence we need not
to consider the case (I) for deriving the largest eigenvalue of Aˆ(m).
Next, we compare the eigenvalues of the cases (II) and (III). For this, we prepare the vector v(m) = (v(m)|j)j
that has L elements. As well as the matrix representation, we denote the index of column of the vector by
j ∈ {−L−12 ,−L−32 , ..., L−32 , L−12 }. For s ∈ {−1, 1}, j− ∈ {−L−32 ,−L−52 , ...,m − 2,m − 1} and j+ ∈ {m + 1,m +
2, ..., L−52
L−3
2 }, we define v(m) as
v(m)|sL−12 =
1√
2
gs(L, x, λ
−1,m), (C29)
v(m)|m = g1(L, x, λ−1,m)g−1(L, x, λ−1,m), (C30)
v(m)|j− = g−1(L, x, λ−1,m) cosh
(
L− 1
2
+ j−
)
x, (C31)
v(m)|j+ = g1(L, x, λ−1,m) cosh
(
L− 1
2
− j+
)
x, (C32)
where x ∈ R is a free parameter. In this case, the following equation holds.[
Aˆ(m) − λ(coshx− 1)
2
Iˆ
]
· v(m)|j = −λ
4
δj,mF
(
L, x, λ−1,
2m
L− 3
)
. (C33)
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Here we recall that gs(L, x, λ
−1,m) and F (L, x, λ−1, 2mL−3 ) are defined in Eqs. (C18) and (C1), respectively. In the
following, we set x = xmax(L, λ
−1, 2mL−3 ). From its definition in Eq. (C9), we have that the rhs of Eq. (C33) is zero,
which leads to [
Aˆ(m) − λ(coshxmax(L, λ
−1, 2mL−3 )− 1)
2
Iˆ
]
· v(m)|j = 0. (C34)
Moreover, thanks to Property 1, we find that all the elements of v(m) never become zero simultaneously, and therefore
we conclude that v(m) and λ2 (coshxmax(L, λ
−1, 2mL−3 ) − 1) represent the eigenvector and the eigenvalue of Aˆ(m),
respectively. In particular, if |m| ≤ L−52 , all the elements of v(m) are guaranteed to be positive due to Eq. (C19) in
Property 1. By combining this fact and the fact that Aˆ(m) is an Hermite operator with non-negarive off-diagonal
elements, we conclude that the eigenvalue λ2 (coshxmax(L, λ
−1, 2mL−3 )−1) is the largest eigenvalue of Aˆ(m) if |m| ≤ L−52 .
Finally, from Eq. (C16), we have that
λ
2
[
coshxmax
(
L, λ−1,
2m
L− 3
)
− 1
]
≤ λ
2
(coshxmax(L, λ
−1, 1)− 1). (C35)
Since the rhs represents the eigenvalue of Aˆ(
L−3
2 ), we conclude that Aˆ(
L−3
2 ) has an eigenvalue that is no smaller than
the largest eigenvalue of Aˆ(m) with |m| ≤ L−52 .
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